Dom Frost: ‘Concentration of force’ is a Second World War lesson Britain has forgotten
Be honest—this is ridiculous.
Dom Frost is a public affairs consultant for a leading London based communications firm and a member of the Conservatives Together Programme.
A lesson from the British and Dominion Forces’ experience in the Western Desert may be worth relearning today.
In June 1942, the British Eighth Army was defeated by Axis forces at the Battle of Gazala in Libya. Historians debate many causes for this: its overall operational concept, brigade defensive boxes spread too far apart, the failure to integrate Tobruk effectively into the wider operational plan, and a defensive line that did not extend far enough. In simple terms, Rommel, a master of manoeuvre warfare, exploited these weaknesses by cutting through these positions and concentrating his forces against isolated brigade boxes.
At Gazala, the British held overall numerical advantages in men and tanks, but these were dispersed, while Axis forces achieved local superiority at decisive points, particularly during the Cauldron battles. When people think of the battle, they often compare British versus German tanks in endless “top-trumps” debates. This misses the point. Even if the British had possessed better tanks, the outcome would still have been unlikely to change, because British forces were fragmented.
Leaving aside the historical debates, there is a broader lesson that resonates strongly with Britain and government spending priorities today. The misuse of resources through fragmentation and piecemeal attacks failed against a concentration of force. When General Montgomery later took command of the Eighth Army in August 1942, he emphasised concentrating armoured force at decisive points rather than dispersing units in small packets. This change in approach mattered. Fragmentation at Gazala had cost lives and equipment and led to a retreat. That lesson applies just as much today to government spending and our approach to the economy as it did during the war. Britain spends vast sums of money, yet with remarkably limited visible impact.
Total public spending reached around £1.28 trillion last year. Public expenditure rose sharply during the pandemic, peaking above 50 per cent, and has since remained elevated at around 43–45 per cent. Pandemic conditions aside, it is difficult to argue that this scale of spending has delivered improvements in economic performance or everyday life. The British government has replicated the same errors as British forces did during this period in the desert, using costly but fragmented strategies. There are several examples of this from both current and previous governments.
Britain plans to spend up to £1 billion over a decade on the semiconductor sector through a range of different projects, with an initial £200 million between 2023 and 2025. Last summer Liverpool’s net …
Be honest—this is ridiculous.
Dom Frost is a public affairs consultant for a leading London based communications firm and a member of the Conservatives Together Programme.
A lesson from the British and Dominion Forces’ experience in the Western Desert may be worth relearning today.
In June 1942, the British Eighth Army was defeated by Axis forces at the Battle of Gazala in Libya. Historians debate many causes for this: its overall operational concept, brigade defensive boxes spread too far apart, the failure to integrate Tobruk effectively into the wider operational plan, and a defensive line that did not extend far enough. In simple terms, Rommel, a master of manoeuvre warfare, exploited these weaknesses by cutting through these positions and concentrating his forces against isolated brigade boxes.
At Gazala, the British held overall numerical advantages in men and tanks, but these were dispersed, while Axis forces achieved local superiority at decisive points, particularly during the Cauldron battles. When people think of the battle, they often compare British versus German tanks in endless “top-trumps” debates. This misses the point. Even if the British had possessed better tanks, the outcome would still have been unlikely to change, because British forces were fragmented.
Leaving aside the historical debates, there is a broader lesson that resonates strongly with Britain and government spending priorities today. The misuse of resources through fragmentation and piecemeal attacks failed against a concentration of force. When General Montgomery later took command of the Eighth Army in August 1942, he emphasised concentrating armoured force at decisive points rather than dispersing units in small packets. This change in approach mattered. Fragmentation at Gazala had cost lives and equipment and led to a retreat. That lesson applies just as much today to government spending and our approach to the economy as it did during the war. Britain spends vast sums of money, yet with remarkably limited visible impact.
Total public spending reached around £1.28 trillion last year. Public expenditure rose sharply during the pandemic, peaking above 50 per cent, and has since remained elevated at around 43–45 per cent. Pandemic conditions aside, it is difficult to argue that this scale of spending has delivered improvements in economic performance or everyday life. The British government has replicated the same errors as British forces did during this period in the desert, using costly but fragmented strategies. There are several examples of this from both current and previous governments.
Britain plans to spend up to £1 billion over a decade on the semiconductor sector through a range of different projects, with an initial £200 million between 2023 and 2025. Last summer Liverpool’s net …
Dom Frost: ‘Concentration of force’ is a Second World War lesson Britain has forgotten
Be honest—this is ridiculous.
Dom Frost is a public affairs consultant for a leading London based communications firm and a member of the Conservatives Together Programme.
A lesson from the British and Dominion Forces’ experience in the Western Desert may be worth relearning today.
In June 1942, the British Eighth Army was defeated by Axis forces at the Battle of Gazala in Libya. Historians debate many causes for this: its overall operational concept, brigade defensive boxes spread too far apart, the failure to integrate Tobruk effectively into the wider operational plan, and a defensive line that did not extend far enough. In simple terms, Rommel, a master of manoeuvre warfare, exploited these weaknesses by cutting through these positions and concentrating his forces against isolated brigade boxes.
At Gazala, the British held overall numerical advantages in men and tanks, but these were dispersed, while Axis forces achieved local superiority at decisive points, particularly during the Cauldron battles. When people think of the battle, they often compare British versus German tanks in endless “top-trumps” debates. This misses the point. Even if the British had possessed better tanks, the outcome would still have been unlikely to change, because British forces were fragmented.
Leaving aside the historical debates, there is a broader lesson that resonates strongly with Britain and government spending priorities today. The misuse of resources through fragmentation and piecemeal attacks failed against a concentration of force. When General Montgomery later took command of the Eighth Army in August 1942, he emphasised concentrating armoured force at decisive points rather than dispersing units in small packets. This change in approach mattered. Fragmentation at Gazala had cost lives and equipment and led to a retreat. That lesson applies just as much today to government spending and our approach to the economy as it did during the war. Britain spends vast sums of money, yet with remarkably limited visible impact.
Total public spending reached around £1.28 trillion last year. Public expenditure rose sharply during the pandemic, peaking above 50 per cent, and has since remained elevated at around 43–45 per cent. Pandemic conditions aside, it is difficult to argue that this scale of spending has delivered improvements in economic performance or everyday life. The British government has replicated the same errors as British forces did during this period in the desert, using costly but fragmented strategies. There are several examples of this from both current and previous governments.
Britain plans to spend up to £1 billion over a decade on the semiconductor sector through a range of different projects, with an initial £200 million between 2023 and 2025. Last summer Liverpool’s net …
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