Judge Garnett (Southern District of New York) takes apparent issue with the practical implications of SCOTUS doctrine
Law enforcement shouldn't be political.
From one of the opinions issued today ( ):
> The question before the Court is whether, under the relevant statutes and Supreme Court precedent, the crimes charged in Counts One and Two are "crimes of violence." The Court would be remiss not to note at the outset the apparent absurdity of the inquiry. The Defendant is charged with selecting a stranger to be killed based on his employment; carefully planning the killing, including identifying where and when the selected victim would be most vulnerable; traveling across multiple states to carry out that killing; and then gunning the victim down on a public street in midtown Manhattan, using a handgun equipped with a silencer.! No one could seriously question that this is violent criminal conduct. And yet, over the course of the last two decades or so, the Supreme Court has embarked upon a legal journey, explained herein, that now requires lower courts to engage in an analysis totally divorced from the conduct at issue and centered on the hypothetically least serious conduct that the charged crime could possibly cover.
This is typically shorthanded as the "categorical approach." Whatever the merits of that approach in contexts that require the assessment of past state criminal convictions (e.g., the removal criteria in the Immigration and Nationality Act or the sentencing enhancements in the Armed Career Criminal Act), it has proven a poor fit for Section 924(c) and 924(i), where the defendant's alleged conduct is encompassed within the indictment and full fact-finding (whether by a jury or by the court) can occur, with procedural protections for the defendant. It has produced questionable results that defy common sense, see, e.g., United States v. Lung'aho, 72F.4th 845, 847, 851 (8th Cir. 2023) (arson is not a "crime of violence" under Section 924(c)) ?; United States v. Walker, 934 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2019) (kidnapping is not a "crime of violence"), and, equally importantly, has proven increasingly difficult for lower courts to apply with any confidence or consistency. These are not new observations. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845, 863-72 (2022) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (decrying the current state of the Supreme Court's categorical approach jurisprudence and urging a revival of the residual clause or a return to a constitutionally-permitted conduct-based analysis).
However, regardless of its own views, a district court is duty-bound to follow binding Supreme Court precedent. The analysis contained in the balance of this Opinion may strike the average person —and indeed many lawyers and judges—as tortured and strange, and the result may seem contrary to our intuitions about the criminal law. But it represents the Court's committed effort to faithfully apply the dictates of the Supreme Court to the charges in this case.
The law must be the Court's only concern.
---------
For me, this gets at the heart of something I am particularly passionate about but often have trouble articulating well. There is an apparent belief embedded in the American justice system about the …
Law enforcement shouldn't be political.
From one of the opinions issued today ( ):
> The question before the Court is whether, under the relevant statutes and Supreme Court precedent, the crimes charged in Counts One and Two are "crimes of violence." The Court would be remiss not to note at the outset the apparent absurdity of the inquiry. The Defendant is charged with selecting a stranger to be killed based on his employment; carefully planning the killing, including identifying where and when the selected victim would be most vulnerable; traveling across multiple states to carry out that killing; and then gunning the victim down on a public street in midtown Manhattan, using a handgun equipped with a silencer.! No one could seriously question that this is violent criminal conduct. And yet, over the course of the last two decades or so, the Supreme Court has embarked upon a legal journey, explained herein, that now requires lower courts to engage in an analysis totally divorced from the conduct at issue and centered on the hypothetically least serious conduct that the charged crime could possibly cover.
This is typically shorthanded as the "categorical approach." Whatever the merits of that approach in contexts that require the assessment of past state criminal convictions (e.g., the removal criteria in the Immigration and Nationality Act or the sentencing enhancements in the Armed Career Criminal Act), it has proven a poor fit for Section 924(c) and 924(i), where the defendant's alleged conduct is encompassed within the indictment and full fact-finding (whether by a jury or by the court) can occur, with procedural protections for the defendant. It has produced questionable results that defy common sense, see, e.g., United States v. Lung'aho, 72F.4th 845, 847, 851 (8th Cir. 2023) (arson is not a "crime of violence" under Section 924(c)) ?; United States v. Walker, 934 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2019) (kidnapping is not a "crime of violence"), and, equally importantly, has proven increasingly difficult for lower courts to apply with any confidence or consistency. These are not new observations. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845, 863-72 (2022) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (decrying the current state of the Supreme Court's categorical approach jurisprudence and urging a revival of the residual clause or a return to a constitutionally-permitted conduct-based analysis).
However, regardless of its own views, a district court is duty-bound to follow binding Supreme Court precedent. The analysis contained in the balance of this Opinion may strike the average person —and indeed many lawyers and judges—as tortured and strange, and the result may seem contrary to our intuitions about the criminal law. But it represents the Court's committed effort to faithfully apply the dictates of the Supreme Court to the charges in this case.
The law must be the Court's only concern.
---------
For me, this gets at the heart of something I am particularly passionate about but often have trouble articulating well. There is an apparent belief embedded in the American justice system about the …
Judge Garnett (Southern District of New York) takes apparent issue with the practical implications of SCOTUS doctrine
Law enforcement shouldn't be political.
From one of the opinions issued today ( ):
> The question before the Court is whether, under the relevant statutes and Supreme Court precedent, the crimes charged in Counts One and Two are "crimes of violence." The Court would be remiss not to note at the outset the apparent absurdity of the inquiry. The Defendant is charged with selecting a stranger to be killed based on his employment; carefully planning the killing, including identifying where and when the selected victim would be most vulnerable; traveling across multiple states to carry out that killing; and then gunning the victim down on a public street in midtown Manhattan, using a handgun equipped with a silencer.! No one could seriously question that this is violent criminal conduct. And yet, over the course of the last two decades or so, the Supreme Court has embarked upon a legal journey, explained herein, that now requires lower courts to engage in an analysis totally divorced from the conduct at issue and centered on the hypothetically least serious conduct that the charged crime could possibly cover.
This is typically shorthanded as the "categorical approach." Whatever the merits of that approach in contexts that require the assessment of past state criminal convictions (e.g., the removal criteria in the Immigration and Nationality Act or the sentencing enhancements in the Armed Career Criminal Act), it has proven a poor fit for Section 924(c) and 924(i), where the defendant's alleged conduct is encompassed within the indictment and full fact-finding (whether by a jury or by the court) can occur, with procedural protections for the defendant. It has produced questionable results that defy common sense, see, e.g., United States v. Lung'aho, 72F.4th 845, 847, 851 (8th Cir. 2023) (arson is not a "crime of violence" under Section 924(c)) ?; United States v. Walker, 934 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2019) (kidnapping is not a "crime of violence"), and, equally importantly, has proven increasingly difficult for lower courts to apply with any confidence or consistency. These are not new observations. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845, 863-72 (2022) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (decrying the current state of the Supreme Court's categorical approach jurisprudence and urging a revival of the residual clause or a return to a constitutionally-permitted conduct-based analysis).
However, regardless of its own views, a district court is duty-bound to follow binding Supreme Court precedent. The analysis contained in the balance of this Opinion may strike the average person —and indeed many lawyers and judges—as tortured and strange, and the result may seem contrary to our intuitions about the criminal law. But it represents the Court's committed effort to faithfully apply the dictates of the Supreme Court to the charges in this case.
The law must be the Court's only concern.
---------
For me, this gets at the heart of something I am particularly passionate about but often have trouble articulating well. There is an apparent belief embedded in the American justice system about the …
0 Comments
0 Shares
50 Views
0 Reviews
