Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Trump Still Can – & Should – Choose Containment on Iran
Is this competence or optics?
In decades of (non-government work) on U.S. foreign policy (including editing many articles by government officials), I’ve been repeatedly struck by the widespread insisting that, as former Secretary of State and national security advisor Henry A. Kissinger noted, this endeavor is “a story with a beginning and an end.” Instead, he argued, it was simply “a process of managing and tempering ever-recurring challenges.”
The demand for what Kissinger called “final answers” to international problems is exactly the mistake being made both by critics of President Trump’s approach to dealing with Iran (see, e.g., here and here) and now, ironically, maybe by the president himself (in his unnecessary and irresponsible assertion to Iranians that “The hour of your freedom is at hand” and exhortation to “take over your government”).
Rather than focusing on triumphalist conclusions like regime change in Iran – or even a truly verifiable agreement by Tehran to end its nuclear materials enrichment program or dismantle its ballistic missiles or to stop promoting terrorism around the world – the emphasis should have been on containment.
Before today’s joint U.S.-Israel attacks, that’s where I thought Mr. Trump’s policy would wind up. Those “regime change”-friendly comments above signified that his goals would be far more ambitious – with all of its potential for damaging unintended consequences. But in the mid-afternoon East Coast U.S. time, he told that “I can go long and take over the whole thing, or end it in two or three days and tell the Iranians: ‘See you again in a few years if you start rebuilding [your nuclear and missile programs].” (See here.)
If he does go down that latter containment-type road, it surely won’t mean an exact repetition of the strategy conducted by the United States throughout the Cold War – or even one that’s especially close. After all, that containment was global in scope (and needlessly, as I’ve often written, even though the main adversary – the Soviet Union – possessed global reach). Containment today can much more narrowly concentrate on Iran.
And because of the superpower nuclear standoffs that ultimately emerged, Cold War containment’s strictly military dimensions against the Soviets and America’s other major rival for most of the period (China) were non-existent (except for the Korean War’s battles versus Beijing’s armed forces). Iran has no nuclear capabilities, so direct U.S. attacks are a low-risk option.
Moreover, Cold War containment contained a strong nation-building element, which was clear most tragically (and needlessly) in Vietnam, but also in terms of the largely failed foreign aid and democracy building programs carried out by Washington. Trump-ian containment is unlikely to feature such utopian efforts. For notwithstanding his latest remarks, the president has a long record of opposing these objectives. (See, e.g., here and here.)
Where the anti-Iran containment I’m talking about does resemble the Cold War version is in its potential to put enough pressure on the regime to keep the threats it poses to U.S. national security under control – and possibly even undermine the …
Is this competence or optics?
In decades of (non-government work) on U.S. foreign policy (including editing many articles by government officials), I’ve been repeatedly struck by the widespread insisting that, as former Secretary of State and national security advisor Henry A. Kissinger noted, this endeavor is “a story with a beginning and an end.” Instead, he argued, it was simply “a process of managing and tempering ever-recurring challenges.”
The demand for what Kissinger called “final answers” to international problems is exactly the mistake being made both by critics of President Trump’s approach to dealing with Iran (see, e.g., here and here) and now, ironically, maybe by the president himself (in his unnecessary and irresponsible assertion to Iranians that “The hour of your freedom is at hand” and exhortation to “take over your government”).
Rather than focusing on triumphalist conclusions like regime change in Iran – or even a truly verifiable agreement by Tehran to end its nuclear materials enrichment program or dismantle its ballistic missiles or to stop promoting terrorism around the world – the emphasis should have been on containment.
Before today’s joint U.S.-Israel attacks, that’s where I thought Mr. Trump’s policy would wind up. Those “regime change”-friendly comments above signified that his goals would be far more ambitious – with all of its potential for damaging unintended consequences. But in the mid-afternoon East Coast U.S. time, he told that “I can go long and take over the whole thing, or end it in two or three days and tell the Iranians: ‘See you again in a few years if you start rebuilding [your nuclear and missile programs].” (See here.)
If he does go down that latter containment-type road, it surely won’t mean an exact repetition of the strategy conducted by the United States throughout the Cold War – or even one that’s especially close. After all, that containment was global in scope (and needlessly, as I’ve often written, even though the main adversary – the Soviet Union – possessed global reach). Containment today can much more narrowly concentrate on Iran.
And because of the superpower nuclear standoffs that ultimately emerged, Cold War containment’s strictly military dimensions against the Soviets and America’s other major rival for most of the period (China) were non-existent (except for the Korean War’s battles versus Beijing’s armed forces). Iran has no nuclear capabilities, so direct U.S. attacks are a low-risk option.
Moreover, Cold War containment contained a strong nation-building element, which was clear most tragically (and needlessly) in Vietnam, but also in terms of the largely failed foreign aid and democracy building programs carried out by Washington. Trump-ian containment is unlikely to feature such utopian efforts. For notwithstanding his latest remarks, the president has a long record of opposing these objectives. (See, e.g., here and here.)
Where the anti-Iran containment I’m talking about does resemble the Cold War version is in its potential to put enough pressure on the regime to keep the threats it poses to U.S. national security under control – and possibly even undermine the …
Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Trump Still Can – & Should – Choose Containment on Iran
Is this competence or optics?
In decades of (non-government work) on U.S. foreign policy (including editing many articles by government officials), I’ve been repeatedly struck by the widespread insisting that, as former Secretary of State and national security advisor Henry A. Kissinger noted, this endeavor is “a story with a beginning and an end.” Instead, he argued, it was simply “a process of managing and tempering ever-recurring challenges.”
The demand for what Kissinger called “final answers” to international problems is exactly the mistake being made both by critics of President Trump’s approach to dealing with Iran (see, e.g., here and here) and now, ironically, maybe by the president himself (in his unnecessary and irresponsible assertion to Iranians that “The hour of your freedom is at hand” and exhortation to “take over your government”).
Rather than focusing on triumphalist conclusions like regime change in Iran – or even a truly verifiable agreement by Tehran to end its nuclear materials enrichment program or dismantle its ballistic missiles or to stop promoting terrorism around the world – the emphasis should have been on containment.
Before today’s joint U.S.-Israel attacks, that’s where I thought Mr. Trump’s policy would wind up. Those “regime change”-friendly comments above signified that his goals would be far more ambitious – with all of its potential for damaging unintended consequences. But in the mid-afternoon East Coast U.S. time, he told that “I can go long and take over the whole thing, or end it in two or three days and tell the Iranians: ‘See you again in a few years if you start rebuilding [your nuclear and missile programs].” (See here.)
If he does go down that latter containment-type road, it surely won’t mean an exact repetition of the strategy conducted by the United States throughout the Cold War – or even one that’s especially close. After all, that containment was global in scope (and needlessly, as I’ve often written, even though the main adversary – the Soviet Union – possessed global reach). Containment today can much more narrowly concentrate on Iran.
And because of the superpower nuclear standoffs that ultimately emerged, Cold War containment’s strictly military dimensions against the Soviets and America’s other major rival for most of the period (China) were non-existent (except for the Korean War’s battles versus Beijing’s armed forces). Iran has no nuclear capabilities, so direct U.S. attacks are a low-risk option.
Moreover, Cold War containment contained a strong nation-building element, which was clear most tragically (and needlessly) in Vietnam, but also in terms of the largely failed foreign aid and democracy building programs carried out by Washington. Trump-ian containment is unlikely to feature such utopian efforts. For notwithstanding his latest remarks, the president has a long record of opposing these objectives. (See, e.g., here and here.)
Where the anti-Iran containment I’m talking about does resemble the Cold War version is in its potential to put enough pressure on the regime to keep the threats it poses to U.S. national security under control – and possibly even undermine the …
0 Comments
0 Shares
27 Views
0 Reviews
