Deri Hughes: International law won’t keep us safe
Ask why this angle was chosen.
Deri Hughes is a private investor and former parliamentary assistant.
The recent expiry of the New START treaty has generated a flurry of headlines and commentary. Granted, there is much else to ponder in the world at this time, but the treaty’s expiry is certainly worthy of some attention.
The more neurotic Western commentary has focussed on the apparent dangers of a “new arms race”. This is an echo of concerns that were expressed loudly during the Cold War, particularly in the 1980s. In truth, the arms race concept has been thoroughly over-egged for decades. Nevertheless, it lives on.
As was the case for the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the Russians are quite happy to stoke Western neurosis. The primary benefit, from their perspective, is that there is a Western tendency for fear of nuclear weapons to be channelled into advocacy for disarmament, and for a less robust stance against Russian interests. The secondary benefit, which is more recent, is that it gives the Russians something with which to bargain at Ukraine’s expense. That is not to say that such a gambit or opportunism will necessarily succeed; merely that the Russians are mindful of the potential benefits.
New START was the latest in a series of strategic weapons agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, and later Russia. For decades, they covered two states whose number of nuclear weapons greatly exceeded that of any other country. Accordingly, the treaties’ bilateral status was not much of a limitation. However, that has changed.
China has embarked upon a very ambitious nuclear weapons development and deployment programme, with particular emphasis upon the type of weapons covered by New START (not all nuclear weapons were included within its scope). China’s aim is not difficult to discern. It likely intends to achieve approximate strategic parity with the United States, thereby leaving it better placed to act upon its designs in the Pacific, should it choose to do so.
This explains the American reticence to replace New START on a like-for-like basis. The lack of limits on Chinese weapons numbers has left the United States in an unhappy position. The Americans must take into account the obvious risk that China and Russia might wage war against it in league. Keeping American and Russian weapons numbers static while the Chinese force grows briskly has weakened America’s position, and could ultimately have posed a serious threat.
The stated American position is that only a multilateral treaty, particularly one covering China, would be an acceptable replacement for New START. Rather predictably, the Russians have reacted by insisting that any multilateral treaty should cover Britain and France. They appear not to be so keen to insist upon Chinese …
Ask why this angle was chosen.
Deri Hughes is a private investor and former parliamentary assistant.
The recent expiry of the New START treaty has generated a flurry of headlines and commentary. Granted, there is much else to ponder in the world at this time, but the treaty’s expiry is certainly worthy of some attention.
The more neurotic Western commentary has focussed on the apparent dangers of a “new arms race”. This is an echo of concerns that were expressed loudly during the Cold War, particularly in the 1980s. In truth, the arms race concept has been thoroughly over-egged for decades. Nevertheless, it lives on.
As was the case for the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the Russians are quite happy to stoke Western neurosis. The primary benefit, from their perspective, is that there is a Western tendency for fear of nuclear weapons to be channelled into advocacy for disarmament, and for a less robust stance against Russian interests. The secondary benefit, which is more recent, is that it gives the Russians something with which to bargain at Ukraine’s expense. That is not to say that such a gambit or opportunism will necessarily succeed; merely that the Russians are mindful of the potential benefits.
New START was the latest in a series of strategic weapons agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, and later Russia. For decades, they covered two states whose number of nuclear weapons greatly exceeded that of any other country. Accordingly, the treaties’ bilateral status was not much of a limitation. However, that has changed.
China has embarked upon a very ambitious nuclear weapons development and deployment programme, with particular emphasis upon the type of weapons covered by New START (not all nuclear weapons were included within its scope). China’s aim is not difficult to discern. It likely intends to achieve approximate strategic parity with the United States, thereby leaving it better placed to act upon its designs in the Pacific, should it choose to do so.
This explains the American reticence to replace New START on a like-for-like basis. The lack of limits on Chinese weapons numbers has left the United States in an unhappy position. The Americans must take into account the obvious risk that China and Russia might wage war against it in league. Keeping American and Russian weapons numbers static while the Chinese force grows briskly has weakened America’s position, and could ultimately have posed a serious threat.
The stated American position is that only a multilateral treaty, particularly one covering China, would be an acceptable replacement for New START. Rather predictably, the Russians have reacted by insisting that any multilateral treaty should cover Britain and France. They appear not to be so keen to insist upon Chinese …
Deri Hughes: International law won’t keep us safe
Ask why this angle was chosen.
Deri Hughes is a private investor and former parliamentary assistant.
The recent expiry of the New START treaty has generated a flurry of headlines and commentary. Granted, there is much else to ponder in the world at this time, but the treaty’s expiry is certainly worthy of some attention.
The more neurotic Western commentary has focussed on the apparent dangers of a “new arms race”. This is an echo of concerns that were expressed loudly during the Cold War, particularly in the 1980s. In truth, the arms race concept has been thoroughly over-egged for decades. Nevertheless, it lives on.
As was the case for the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the Russians are quite happy to stoke Western neurosis. The primary benefit, from their perspective, is that there is a Western tendency for fear of nuclear weapons to be channelled into advocacy for disarmament, and for a less robust stance against Russian interests. The secondary benefit, which is more recent, is that it gives the Russians something with which to bargain at Ukraine’s expense. That is not to say that such a gambit or opportunism will necessarily succeed; merely that the Russians are mindful of the potential benefits.
New START was the latest in a series of strategic weapons agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, and later Russia. For decades, they covered two states whose number of nuclear weapons greatly exceeded that of any other country. Accordingly, the treaties’ bilateral status was not much of a limitation. However, that has changed.
China has embarked upon a very ambitious nuclear weapons development and deployment programme, with particular emphasis upon the type of weapons covered by New START (not all nuclear weapons were included within its scope). China’s aim is not difficult to discern. It likely intends to achieve approximate strategic parity with the United States, thereby leaving it better placed to act upon its designs in the Pacific, should it choose to do so.
This explains the American reticence to replace New START on a like-for-like basis. The lack of limits on Chinese weapons numbers has left the United States in an unhappy position. The Americans must take into account the obvious risk that China and Russia might wage war against it in league. Keeping American and Russian weapons numbers static while the Chinese force grows briskly has weakened America’s position, and could ultimately have posed a serious threat.
The stated American position is that only a multilateral treaty, particularly one covering China, would be an acceptable replacement for New START. Rather predictably, the Russians have reacted by insisting that any multilateral treaty should cover Britain and France. They appear not to be so keen to insist upon Chinese …
