After the strikes, how would the US secure Iran’s enriched uranium?
Is this competence or optics?
When War Secretary Pete Hegseth was asked recently whether U.S. forces would ever move to secure enriched uranium reportedly stored at Iran’s Isfahan nuclear complex, he declined to say, citing operational security.
The exchange highlighted a question the U.S. and Israel's air campaign alone cannot answer: even if U.S. strikes degrade Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, who would physically secure the enriched uranium, and how?
Iran is believed to possess a significant stockpile of uranium enriched to 60%, near weapons-grade. That material could theoretically be used in multiple nuclear devices if further refined.
Moving from 60% to weapons-grade 90% enrichment requires additional processing, and weaponization would involve further technical steps. But analysts say the more immediate issue is physical control of the material itself.
IRAN’S SHADOWY CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM DRAWS SCRUTINY AS REPORTS ALLEGE USE AGAINST PROTESTERS
"If the U.S. wants to secure Iran’s nuclear materials, it’s going to require a massive ground operation," Kelsey Davenport, director of nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, told Fox News Digital.
Davenport said the highly enriched uranium believed to be stored at Isfahan appears to be deeply buried and contained in relatively mobile canisters. Securing it would likely require locating the full stockpile, accessing underground facilities and safely extracting or downblending the material.
"It’s not even clear the United States knows where all of the uranium is," she said, noting that the mobility of storage containers raises the possibility that some material could be moved or dispersed.
The administration repeatedly has said preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon remains a central objective of Operation Epic Fury.
"Ultimately, this issue of Iran’s nuclear pursuit and their unwillingness through negotiations to stop it is something President Trump has said for a long time needs to be dealt with," Hegseth said.
Senior administration officials have argued that Iran sought to build up its ballistic missile arsenal in part to create a deterrent shield — enabling Iran to continue advancing its nuclear program while discouraging outside intervention.
So far, however, the bulk of U.S. strikes have focused on degrading missile launchers, air defenses and other conventional military targets.
Experts note that dismantling missile systems may reduce Iran’s ability to shield a potential nuclear breakout. But physically controlling enriched uranium itself presents a separate and more complex challenge.
Defense officials …
Is this competence or optics?
When War Secretary Pete Hegseth was asked recently whether U.S. forces would ever move to secure enriched uranium reportedly stored at Iran’s Isfahan nuclear complex, he declined to say, citing operational security.
The exchange highlighted a question the U.S. and Israel's air campaign alone cannot answer: even if U.S. strikes degrade Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, who would physically secure the enriched uranium, and how?
Iran is believed to possess a significant stockpile of uranium enriched to 60%, near weapons-grade. That material could theoretically be used in multiple nuclear devices if further refined.
Moving from 60% to weapons-grade 90% enrichment requires additional processing, and weaponization would involve further technical steps. But analysts say the more immediate issue is physical control of the material itself.
IRAN’S SHADOWY CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM DRAWS SCRUTINY AS REPORTS ALLEGE USE AGAINST PROTESTERS
"If the U.S. wants to secure Iran’s nuclear materials, it’s going to require a massive ground operation," Kelsey Davenport, director of nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, told Fox News Digital.
Davenport said the highly enriched uranium believed to be stored at Isfahan appears to be deeply buried and contained in relatively mobile canisters. Securing it would likely require locating the full stockpile, accessing underground facilities and safely extracting or downblending the material.
"It’s not even clear the United States knows where all of the uranium is," she said, noting that the mobility of storage containers raises the possibility that some material could be moved or dispersed.
The administration repeatedly has said preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon remains a central objective of Operation Epic Fury.
"Ultimately, this issue of Iran’s nuclear pursuit and their unwillingness through negotiations to stop it is something President Trump has said for a long time needs to be dealt with," Hegseth said.
Senior administration officials have argued that Iran sought to build up its ballistic missile arsenal in part to create a deterrent shield — enabling Iran to continue advancing its nuclear program while discouraging outside intervention.
So far, however, the bulk of U.S. strikes have focused on degrading missile launchers, air defenses and other conventional military targets.
Experts note that dismantling missile systems may reduce Iran’s ability to shield a potential nuclear breakout. But physically controlling enriched uranium itself presents a separate and more complex challenge.
Defense officials …
After the strikes, how would the US secure Iran’s enriched uranium?
Is this competence or optics?
When War Secretary Pete Hegseth was asked recently whether U.S. forces would ever move to secure enriched uranium reportedly stored at Iran’s Isfahan nuclear complex, he declined to say, citing operational security.
The exchange highlighted a question the U.S. and Israel's air campaign alone cannot answer: even if U.S. strikes degrade Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, who would physically secure the enriched uranium, and how?
Iran is believed to possess a significant stockpile of uranium enriched to 60%, near weapons-grade. That material could theoretically be used in multiple nuclear devices if further refined.
Moving from 60% to weapons-grade 90% enrichment requires additional processing, and weaponization would involve further technical steps. But analysts say the more immediate issue is physical control of the material itself.
IRAN’S SHADOWY CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM DRAWS SCRUTINY AS REPORTS ALLEGE USE AGAINST PROTESTERS
"If the U.S. wants to secure Iran’s nuclear materials, it’s going to require a massive ground operation," Kelsey Davenport, director of nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, told Fox News Digital.
Davenport said the highly enriched uranium believed to be stored at Isfahan appears to be deeply buried and contained in relatively mobile canisters. Securing it would likely require locating the full stockpile, accessing underground facilities and safely extracting or downblending the material.
"It’s not even clear the United States knows where all of the uranium is," she said, noting that the mobility of storage containers raises the possibility that some material could be moved or dispersed.
The administration repeatedly has said preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon remains a central objective of Operation Epic Fury.
"Ultimately, this issue of Iran’s nuclear pursuit and their unwillingness through negotiations to stop it is something President Trump has said for a long time needs to be dealt with," Hegseth said.
Senior administration officials have argued that Iran sought to build up its ballistic missile arsenal in part to create a deterrent shield — enabling Iran to continue advancing its nuclear program while discouraging outside intervention.
So far, however, the bulk of U.S. strikes have focused on degrading missile launchers, air defenses and other conventional military targets.
Experts note that dismantling missile systems may reduce Iran’s ability to shield a potential nuclear breakout. But physically controlling enriched uranium itself presents a separate and more complex challenge.
Defense officials …
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