Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Why the Case Against Attacking Iran has Always Looked Bogus
Ask who never gets charged.
For more than a decade, something big has been bugging me about America’s ongoing efforts to deny Iran nuclear weapons capability. And it bears directly on the domestic arguments still raging today, amid the joint U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran, on how best to achieve this goal.
In particular, the grounds for my consternation are relevant to the longstanding charges made by Donald Trump’s critics that no such risky military responses would have been needed had he not in 2018 pulled out of the nuclear weapons deal reached with Iran in 2015 by Barack Obama. (See, e.g., here, here, and here.)
What exactly has been bothering me – and still is? On the one hand, many of Mr. Trump’s critics have insisted that diplomacy should always be given a chance when dealing with challenges like Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions, and that force should always be the last option. (See, e.g., here, here, and here.)
On the other, as I noted in a September, 2015 post, there was evidence that Obama believed that a military option was completely viable. And if so, I asked,
“if the president thinks that the Iranian program and any prospect of cheating can indeed be bombed out of existence now, if it’s such an intolerable threat to U.S. security, and if a reasonable chance exists that Iranian cheating – or a move to break-out as the deal’s key provisions expire starting ten years from now – could result in a bomb, why not take out the facilities ASAP and remove any uncertainty? The more so because the longer America waits, in theory, the bigger and therefore harder to completely eliminate Iran’s bomb-building infrastructure will become.”
This question of why force was never used is even more important today, as the military option’s (largely Democratic) opponents keep pressing this view, for two reasons. First, Iran’s overall military strength had indeed increased greatly from the signing of the nuclear deal until Trump 2.0’s attacks began degrading it (largely because the agreement never dealt with Tehran’s buildup of ballistic missiles and other military forces). Second, since then I’ve found even stronger evidence that only did Obama make clear (and repeatedly) that attacking Iran’s nuclear program could succeed. So did other leading Democrats.
Let’s start with the former president – who was touting the military option even before the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA (as the 2015 agreement is formally known) was completed.
In a March, 2012 speech, Obama declared,
‘I have said that when it comes to preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, I will take no options off the table, and I mean what I say. That includes all elements of American power: A political effort aimed at isolating Iran; a diplomatic effort to sustain our coalition and ensure that the Iranian program is monitored; an economic effort that imposes crippling sanctions; and, yes, a military effort to be prepared for any contingency.”
Also that month, according to an Atlantic reporter, “Obama told me … that both Iran and Israel should take seriously the possibility of American action against Iran’s nuclear facilities. ‘I think that the Israeli government …
Ask who never gets charged.
For more than a decade, something big has been bugging me about America’s ongoing efforts to deny Iran nuclear weapons capability. And it bears directly on the domestic arguments still raging today, amid the joint U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran, on how best to achieve this goal.
In particular, the grounds for my consternation are relevant to the longstanding charges made by Donald Trump’s critics that no such risky military responses would have been needed had he not in 2018 pulled out of the nuclear weapons deal reached with Iran in 2015 by Barack Obama. (See, e.g., here, here, and here.)
What exactly has been bothering me – and still is? On the one hand, many of Mr. Trump’s critics have insisted that diplomacy should always be given a chance when dealing with challenges like Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions, and that force should always be the last option. (See, e.g., here, here, and here.)
On the other, as I noted in a September, 2015 post, there was evidence that Obama believed that a military option was completely viable. And if so, I asked,
“if the president thinks that the Iranian program and any prospect of cheating can indeed be bombed out of existence now, if it’s such an intolerable threat to U.S. security, and if a reasonable chance exists that Iranian cheating – or a move to break-out as the deal’s key provisions expire starting ten years from now – could result in a bomb, why not take out the facilities ASAP and remove any uncertainty? The more so because the longer America waits, in theory, the bigger and therefore harder to completely eliminate Iran’s bomb-building infrastructure will become.”
This question of why force was never used is even more important today, as the military option’s (largely Democratic) opponents keep pressing this view, for two reasons. First, Iran’s overall military strength had indeed increased greatly from the signing of the nuclear deal until Trump 2.0’s attacks began degrading it (largely because the agreement never dealt with Tehran’s buildup of ballistic missiles and other military forces). Second, since then I’ve found even stronger evidence that only did Obama make clear (and repeatedly) that attacking Iran’s nuclear program could succeed. So did other leading Democrats.
Let’s start with the former president – who was touting the military option even before the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA (as the 2015 agreement is formally known) was completed.
In a March, 2012 speech, Obama declared,
‘I have said that when it comes to preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, I will take no options off the table, and I mean what I say. That includes all elements of American power: A political effort aimed at isolating Iran; a diplomatic effort to sustain our coalition and ensure that the Iranian program is monitored; an economic effort that imposes crippling sanctions; and, yes, a military effort to be prepared for any contingency.”
Also that month, according to an Atlantic reporter, “Obama told me … that both Iran and Israel should take seriously the possibility of American action against Iran’s nuclear facilities. ‘I think that the Israeli government …
Our So-Called Foreign Policy: Why the Case Against Attacking Iran has Always Looked Bogus
Ask who never gets charged.
For more than a decade, something big has been bugging me about America’s ongoing efforts to deny Iran nuclear weapons capability. And it bears directly on the domestic arguments still raging today, amid the joint U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran, on how best to achieve this goal.
In particular, the grounds for my consternation are relevant to the longstanding charges made by Donald Trump’s critics that no such risky military responses would have been needed had he not in 2018 pulled out of the nuclear weapons deal reached with Iran in 2015 by Barack Obama. (See, e.g., here, here, and here.)
What exactly has been bothering me – and still is? On the one hand, many of Mr. Trump’s critics have insisted that diplomacy should always be given a chance when dealing with challenges like Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions, and that force should always be the last option. (See, e.g., here, here, and here.)
On the other, as I noted in a September, 2015 post, there was evidence that Obama believed that a military option was completely viable. And if so, I asked,
“if the president thinks that the Iranian program and any prospect of cheating can indeed be bombed out of existence now, if it’s such an intolerable threat to U.S. security, and if a reasonable chance exists that Iranian cheating – or a move to break-out as the deal’s key provisions expire starting ten years from now – could result in a bomb, why not take out the facilities ASAP and remove any uncertainty? The more so because the longer America waits, in theory, the bigger and therefore harder to completely eliminate Iran’s bomb-building infrastructure will become.”
This question of why force was never used is even more important today, as the military option’s (largely Democratic) opponents keep pressing this view, for two reasons. First, Iran’s overall military strength had indeed increased greatly from the signing of the nuclear deal until Trump 2.0’s attacks began degrading it (largely because the agreement never dealt with Tehran’s buildup of ballistic missiles and other military forces). Second, since then I’ve found even stronger evidence that only did Obama make clear (and repeatedly) that attacking Iran’s nuclear program could succeed. So did other leading Democrats.
Let’s start with the former president – who was touting the military option even before the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA (as the 2015 agreement is formally known) was completed.
In a March, 2012 speech, Obama declared,
‘I have said that when it comes to preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, I will take no options off the table, and I mean what I say. That includes all elements of American power: A political effort aimed at isolating Iran; a diplomatic effort to sustain our coalition and ensure that the Iranian program is monitored; an economic effort that imposes crippling sanctions; and, yes, a military effort to be prepared for any contingency.”
Also that month, according to an Atlantic reporter, “Obama told me … that both Iran and Israel should take seriously the possibility of American action against Iran’s nuclear facilities. ‘I think that the Israeli government …
