Fleur Butler: How cultural icons are radicalising a generation of girls – straight from the populist playbook
Transparency shouldn't be controversial.
Fleur Butler, OBE is Director of Development for the Conservative Women’s Organisation, has sat on the National Convention and is founder of a new think tank, Resourceful Women.
At the start of this year I read two striking pieces on the shifting female vote, both drawing on research from King’s College London showing young women’s accelerating move to the Left.
Yet while a handful of female journalists are sounding the alarm, mainstream commentary remains fixated on boys, leaving girls, once again, ignored, sentimentalised or misread by the very institutions that claim to analyse them.
In the New Statesman, ConservativeHome columnist Scarlett Maguire emphasised loneliness and economic anxiety of young women; In the Telegraph, Zoe Strimpel stressed the young women’s ideological certainty to the point of destroying the world they inherited. Both point to the same conclusion: the most consequential political shift is happening among girls, not boys.
The data backs this up. In Britain’s 2024 election, most young men still voted for parties of the Left despite the panic over “right‑wing boys”. The widening gender gap is driven far more by women moving Left than by men shifting Right.
This cuts against the story our commentariat prefers. We are repeatedly told that young men are the epicentre of radicalisation, volatile, misogynistic, one podcast away from extremism. Not only is this narrative misandrist; it obscures the sharper electoral point. After all, misogyny and hate have never belonged solely to the Right.
Politicians misread the generation now coming of age at our peril which leads to a dangerous asymmetry: political anxiety fixates on young men, while an equally powerful shift among young women is treated as a virtue by the left, or as merely non winnable votes by the right. The commentariat fails to see that populism, Left or Right, draws on the same emotional architecture.
A better understanding of how populism actually works is needed rather than focusing on each sex as different. Populism rises foremost with economic insecurity as a vital precursor to radicalism. The shockwave from the 2008 financial crisis still shapes politics today. Populist parties thrive in places that feel “left behind”: eastern Germany, de‑industrialised America, Britain’s Red Wall and coastal towns. National growth can look healthy while local prospects remain bleak.
The economic divide is generational as well as geographical. Older voters are more likely to own homes, carry little debt and enjoy secure pensions. Younger people face high rents, precarious work, and a cost‑of‑living squeeze that feels permanent. But material anxiety alone doesn’t explain why discontent turns populist.
Populism is agreed to contain three further ingredients beyond economics. …
Transparency shouldn't be controversial.
Fleur Butler, OBE is Director of Development for the Conservative Women’s Organisation, has sat on the National Convention and is founder of a new think tank, Resourceful Women.
At the start of this year I read two striking pieces on the shifting female vote, both drawing on research from King’s College London showing young women’s accelerating move to the Left.
Yet while a handful of female journalists are sounding the alarm, mainstream commentary remains fixated on boys, leaving girls, once again, ignored, sentimentalised or misread by the very institutions that claim to analyse them.
In the New Statesman, ConservativeHome columnist Scarlett Maguire emphasised loneliness and economic anxiety of young women; In the Telegraph, Zoe Strimpel stressed the young women’s ideological certainty to the point of destroying the world they inherited. Both point to the same conclusion: the most consequential political shift is happening among girls, not boys.
The data backs this up. In Britain’s 2024 election, most young men still voted for parties of the Left despite the panic over “right‑wing boys”. The widening gender gap is driven far more by women moving Left than by men shifting Right.
This cuts against the story our commentariat prefers. We are repeatedly told that young men are the epicentre of radicalisation, volatile, misogynistic, one podcast away from extremism. Not only is this narrative misandrist; it obscures the sharper electoral point. After all, misogyny and hate have never belonged solely to the Right.
Politicians misread the generation now coming of age at our peril which leads to a dangerous asymmetry: political anxiety fixates on young men, while an equally powerful shift among young women is treated as a virtue by the left, or as merely non winnable votes by the right. The commentariat fails to see that populism, Left or Right, draws on the same emotional architecture.
A better understanding of how populism actually works is needed rather than focusing on each sex as different. Populism rises foremost with economic insecurity as a vital precursor to radicalism. The shockwave from the 2008 financial crisis still shapes politics today. Populist parties thrive in places that feel “left behind”: eastern Germany, de‑industrialised America, Britain’s Red Wall and coastal towns. National growth can look healthy while local prospects remain bleak.
The economic divide is generational as well as geographical. Older voters are more likely to own homes, carry little debt and enjoy secure pensions. Younger people face high rents, precarious work, and a cost‑of‑living squeeze that feels permanent. But material anxiety alone doesn’t explain why discontent turns populist.
Populism is agreed to contain three further ingredients beyond economics. …
Fleur Butler: How cultural icons are radicalising a generation of girls – straight from the populist playbook
Transparency shouldn't be controversial.
Fleur Butler, OBE is Director of Development for the Conservative Women’s Organisation, has sat on the National Convention and is founder of a new think tank, Resourceful Women.
At the start of this year I read two striking pieces on the shifting female vote, both drawing on research from King’s College London showing young women’s accelerating move to the Left.
Yet while a handful of female journalists are sounding the alarm, mainstream commentary remains fixated on boys, leaving girls, once again, ignored, sentimentalised or misread by the very institutions that claim to analyse them.
In the New Statesman, ConservativeHome columnist Scarlett Maguire emphasised loneliness and economic anxiety of young women; In the Telegraph, Zoe Strimpel stressed the young women’s ideological certainty to the point of destroying the world they inherited. Both point to the same conclusion: the most consequential political shift is happening among girls, not boys.
The data backs this up. In Britain’s 2024 election, most young men still voted for parties of the Left despite the panic over “right‑wing boys”. The widening gender gap is driven far more by women moving Left than by men shifting Right.
This cuts against the story our commentariat prefers. We are repeatedly told that young men are the epicentre of radicalisation, volatile, misogynistic, one podcast away from extremism. Not only is this narrative misandrist; it obscures the sharper electoral point. After all, misogyny and hate have never belonged solely to the Right.
Politicians misread the generation now coming of age at our peril which leads to a dangerous asymmetry: political anxiety fixates on young men, while an equally powerful shift among young women is treated as a virtue by the left, or as merely non winnable votes by the right. The commentariat fails to see that populism, Left or Right, draws on the same emotional architecture.
A better understanding of how populism actually works is needed rather than focusing on each sex as different. Populism rises foremost with economic insecurity as a vital precursor to radicalism. The shockwave from the 2008 financial crisis still shapes politics today. Populist parties thrive in places that feel “left behind”: eastern Germany, de‑industrialised America, Britain’s Red Wall and coastal towns. National growth can look healthy while local prospects remain bleak.
The economic divide is generational as well as geographical. Older voters are more likely to own homes, carry little debt and enjoy secure pensions. Younger people face high rents, precarious work, and a cost‑of‑living squeeze that feels permanent. But material anxiety alone doesn’t explain why discontent turns populist.
Populism is agreed to contain three further ingredients beyond economics. …
